A.M. Vasilyev and other scholars in the field of general theory of law are quite convincing in studying the theory of legal categories (Vasilyev, 1976) . On the other hand, researchers and practical lawyers have not been paying due attention to such an important legal category as "legal principles" from the position of scientifically justified conception of integrative legal consciousness. In connection with the above, it is quite hard to disagree with the viewpoint of T.G. Gordienko who wrote, "Notwithstanding its theoretical and practical value, the issues of the principles of law in modern legal science and study materials on the general theory of law and state are not very popular" (Gordienko, 2000) . For example, researchers do not pay much attention to the study of the most important theoretical issues of the essence of the principles of law. The ambiguous title of the article by T.G. Gordienko herself is quite typical: "Principles of law: the basis of law and legal systems" (emphasis mine).
The term 'principle' was borrowed from the French and German languages in the 18 th century. It goes back to the Latin 'principium' meaning 'basis', 'origin', 'basic position', 'guiding idea', 'basic rule of behaviour'(Etimologicheskii slovar '…, 1994) .
In ancient times, they emphasized that "the principle is the most important part of everything" (principium est potissima pars cujuque rei).
It is noteworthy that most pre-revolutionary specialist had not used the term 'principle of law' in their works, though they mainly analysed the principles of rule. For example, N.N. Polyanskii applied the concept of 'origin': "The origin of participation of the people in administration of justice" (emphasis mine) (Polyanskii, 1911) . Following N.N. Polyanskii I.Ya. Foinitskii wrote, "…Two specific origins of the criminal process are the public origin and the personal origin" (emphasis mine) (Foinitskii, 1912) .
N.N. Rozin in 1916 developed a list of "basic origins and conditions for judicial activity" (Rozin, 1916) . Among the "basic origins" N.N. Rozin quite ambiguously outlined the following leaving it open for discussion: "1) investigative and competitive origin; 2) origin of material truth (proof of criminal charges); 3) origin of spontaneity; 4) origin of oral nature; 5) origin of publicity; 6) judicial language" (Rozin, 1916) .
V.L. Tomin studied the issue quite in detail and found only one work containing the word "principle": "The basic principles of organizing the criminal court procedure" by I.V. Mikhailovskii published in 1905. Though it should be noted that I.V. Mikhailovskii studied "the principles of organizing the criminal court" (emphasis mine) and not the principles of law! If prerevolutionary researchers mentioned the 'principles of law', they studied only statutory legal principles from the standpoint of judicial positivism. However, most often the principles of law were criticized. For example, the generally accepted pre-revolutionary classic of the theory of law, G.F. Shershenevich understood the principles of law as the general idea, the direction the legislator puts, consciously or unconsciously, into a whole series of legal norms (Shershenevich, 1995) . One of the most common was the point of view of E.V. Vas'kovskii. He had developed it without any necessary theoretical arguments, "... the principles of general law and natural law, in particular, are controversial ... it will result in the complete and uncontrolled judicial discretion, which can soon lead to the abuse of power" (Vas'kovskii, 1997).
With such a prevailing position of the majority of leading pre-revolutionary scientists, the conclusions of L.A. Tikhomirov and Ya.P. Kozel'skii seem especially striking. Thus, L.A. Tikhomirov wrote, "The legislators themselves should be guided by something, giving or not giving the person rights or defining any actions as their duty" (Tikhomirov, 1998) . In the distant 1767, Ya.P. Kozelskii was even more theoretically accurate saying that the principles of law are "…something unchangeable and universal, so that the laws issued in the state always correspond to them" (Zolotukhina, 2018) .
At the same time, judicial positivism that had been predominating in the Soviet and Post-Soviet period did not allow researchers to recognize the principles of law as an independent means of legal regulation of social relations with a higher legal force than that of the norms of law, for example, in national regulatory legal acts. (Aleksandrov, 1957 ) (emphasis mine). N.G. Aleksandrov quite consistently outlined such 'principles' of the Soviet law as "securing the political power of the workers led by the working class", "democratic centralism" and "ensuring planned discipline" (Aleksandrov, 1957) .
In 1970 E.A. Lukasheva was one of the first in the USSR to make a step forward, though it was not enough. She determined the principles of law as "… objectively determined the origins which serve as the guide for the system of law" (Lukasheva, 1970 ) (emphasis mine). In the same article E.A. Lukasheva theoretically outlines, "… the origins and ideas are the principles of law" (Lukasheva, 1970 ) (emphasis mine).
E.A. Lukasheva singled out the following "principles of law", which seem quite strange from the position of judicial positivism, and the position of the research discussion conception of integrative law consciousness as well (Ershov, 2018) : 'justice', 'legality', 'continuous connection of rights and obligations', 'combination of persuasion and coercion' (Lukasheva, 1970 and the distinction between them can be made only conditionally, while being embodied in the legal system, legal principles remain the principles of legal consciousness and affect the functioning of the entire legal regulation system (Lukasheva, 1970) . The definition of the principles of law as "a special element of the structure of law" is especially surprising. Unfortunately, S.S. Alekseev did not dwell on the peculiarities of this "special element". In his subsequent works S.S. Alekseev continued writing that "the principles of law… are the ideas… contained in the norms" (Aleskseev, 1989) .
Finally, in 2002 S.S. Alekseev repeated his conclusion (Aleskseev, 2002) .
L.S. Yavich in 1976, following S.S. Alekseev also quite vaguely stated that "the principles of law are the leading origins of its formation, development and functioning" (Yavich, 1976) . At the same time, 2 years later in 1978, he clarified his conclusion, "the principles of law are ... the beginning, the starting ideas of its being ... they are universal, supremely imperative and generally valid" (emphasis mine) (Yavich, 1978) . At the same time, from the position of legal positivism, like most other scholars, L.S. Yavich analysed "norms-principles" rather than principles and norms of law as various legal regulators of social relations (Yavich L.S., 1978) . However, it is noteworthy that back in 1978, L.S. Yavich theoretically convincingly emphasized, "from an epistemological point of view, it is important that the category "principle" is closely related to the categories of "legitimacy" and "essence" (emphasis mine)" (Yavich, 1978) .
O.V. Smirnov made a significant step forward in the study of the principles of law in 1977. He came to the most important conclusion: the principles of law reflect the features of the general, abstract, essential and systemic, the principles are deeper than the norm and the norm is richer than the principle (emphasis mine) (Smirnov, 1977) .
Unfortunately, in the second half of the 20 th century another point of view was "established" in the general theory of law. According to it researchers and practical lawyers, as a rule, analysed "norms-principles". Thus, S.S. Alekseev wrote, "the principles of law mainly appear in the form of norms (norms-principles)" (Alekseev, 2002 to call it the principle of law) with the rule of law is almost equivalent to the denial of legal principles in general" (Gribanov, 1966) . In the second half of the 20 th century, the closest to understanding the essence of the principles of law was, I believe, V.S. Nersesyants.
Nevertheless, he wrote quite vaguely: the principles of law in the "legal system" play the role of "the vital force", "self-regulation mechanism", and "aspiration" ensuring the unity and consistency of all elements of the "legal system" (Nersesyants, 1983) .
Considering the analysed standpoints of the leading Soviet experts in the field of theory of law made in the second half of the 20 th century, let me summarize them as final conclusions from the position of legal positivism. First of all, scholars did not attribute the principles of law to independent legal regulators public relations. They were limited only to the analysis of the norms of law and only in the "legislation", and more precisely in the national regulatory legal acts. Secondly, they did not differentiate between the principles of law and the norms of law, having developed a theoretically debatable concept of "norms-principles of law". Thirdly, they did not establish the correlation between the principles of law and the norms of law.
In this regard, the principles of law in the second half of the 20 th century, as a rule,
were not analysed in textbooks on the theory of law and the state. They were only mentioned in separate textbooks for universities, and only from the position of legal positivism in the most traditional sense. For example, R.Z. Livshits, in the textbook on the theory of law, wrote, "the principle is always the initial guiding origin. With regard to law it is the idea" (Livshits, 1994) .
At the beginning of the 21 st century, many scientists essentially repeated the positions expressed in the second half of the 20 th century. For example, G.T. Chernobel' wrote, "the main essential feature of legal principles (emphasis mine) is that embodying a certain synthesized legal idea, a certain legal ideal ... they act as an ideological key to understanding and perception of the current legal system, ... legal principles are nothing more than legal ideology born by justice" (emphasis mine) (Normotvorcheskaia iuridicheskaia tekhnika, 2011).
However, at the beginning of the 21 st century many experts in the field of the general theory of law began to define the principles of law not just vaguely, but, oddly enough, from contradictory positions of both legal positivism and the unscientific concept of integrative legal consciousness synthesizing not only the principles and norms of law contained in the unified, multilevel and developing system of forms of national and international law, but also non-law, for example, justice, judicial precedents and legal positions of the courts (Ershov, 2018) . (Konovalov, 2018) .
At least, Konovalov's extremely uncertain conclusion is surprising: "Thus, the principles of law operate in law and order in the following ways: 1) directly influencing social relations in the form of generalized rules of social communication; 2) being set as the basic principles of legislation in its positive norms; 3) being "dissolved" in all norms of the legislation; 4) determining the basic method of the field; 5) developing the key conceptual approaches, ensuring stability and consistency of law enforcement practice, including its most important aspect, legal precedents; 6) representing a semantic core of individual and collective legal consciousness, including the system of motivations of legal behaviour; 7) providing a transfer of the ideal model of settling public relations by law into actual public relations; 8) mediating the accumulation in the society of positive practices in law enforcement as the most important prerequisites for its successful development in the present and in the future; 9) being the conceptual ties tending to the disintegration of the civil law tools; 10) acting as factors that unite the elements of an atomized, horizontally integrated society, and a conceptual alternative to selfish irrational behaviour" (Konovalov, 2018 ).
With such a "theoretical" approach, it is not at all strange that in the legal encyclopedic dictionary, the principles of law are considered as "basic ideas, starting points or leading elements of the process of its formation" (Iuridicheskii comply with the laws in order for them to have legal force (Hart, 1961) . R. Dworkin, the student and the most convinced and bright critic of H. Hart, was upholding the second approach. He wrote, "I call a principle such a standard that should be observed not because it contributes to changing or preserving some economic or political situation, but because it expresses some moral requirements, which can be the requirements of justice, fairness, etc." (emphasis mine) (Dworkin, 2004) . The second approach assumes a combination of legal reality and moral value (Hart, 1961) .
In fact, the conclusions of H.L.A. Hart and R. Dworkin were very close. The proof of this, in particular, is the following phrase of H.L.A. Hart: "... the name of a valid right should be deprived of certain rules due to their extreme moral injustice" (Hart, 1961) . In my opinion, the theoretical conclusions of H.L.A. Hart, R. Dworkin and G. Brabant are primarily based on scientifically debatable and diverse concepts of integrative legal consciousness (Hunt, 1985; Meese, 1987; Waldron, 2008) , which artificially synthesizes ontologically diverse social regulators, law and non-law, including law and justice in a single system of forms of national and international law. In practice, such legal consciousness leads to endless and unlimited "erosion" of law by non-law, results in unstable, unexpected, diverse and directly contradictory precedents. In the end it leads to the violation of the rights and legal interests of the subjects of legal relations.
The philosophical encyclopedic dictionary interprets the category "principle" in the subjective and the objective sense. In the subjective sense, as the main position, a prerequisite. In the objective one, as a starting point (Filosofskii entsiklopedichsekii slovar, 2012). For example, Aristotle understood the principle in the objective sense in the form of the first value; the basis on which something exists or will exist (emphasis mine) (Logicheskii slovar '-spravochnik, 1975) . Hence, in the philosophical sense, the category "principle" is characterized by a generalization of the most typical, expressing the regularities underlying something.
It is characteristic that in logic the category "principle" is considered as the central concept, the basis of the system, representing the generalization and distribution of a position in relation to all the phenomena of the area from which this principle is abstracted. In this connection, I think, F. Bacon's conclusion is characteristic:
"Principles are the primary and simplest elements from which everything else was formed" (emphasis mine) (Bacon, 1937) . In turn, I. Kant ingeniously remarked that "the principle is that which contains the basis of the universal connection of everything that represents the phenomenon" (Kant, 1963) . Finally, Hegel wrote, remarkably subtly and deeply: "The principle is ... the unified one ..." (Hegel, 1970) . It seems that, in accordance with the scientifically based concept of integrative legal consciousness, law is expressed not only in the norms of law, but above all in the principles of law contained in a single, multi-level and developing system of forms of national and international law implemented in the state. Consequently, the principles of law are legal regulators of social relations, and not "ideas", "origins", "provisions", etc.
With such a general scientific, theoretical and legal approach, the essence of the principles of law, in my opinion, is that the principles of law are objective legal regulators of social relations. They are primary, expressing the fundamental laws of legal regulation of social relations, the most abstract elements of a single, developing and multi-level system of forms of national and international law. In the process of their specification, authorized law-making bodies develop to a greater degree some "real" norms of law in the forms of both national and international law, including the norms of law in national regulatory and legal acts.
